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Establishing the truth in South African
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R SONGCA* and J LE ROUX**
ABSTRACT
This article critically addresses the manner in which accurate information from child
witnesses is obtained in criminal proceedings. Although establishing the truth is a
primary objective in criminal proceedings, young children are often excluded from the
criminal justice system by being characterised as unreliable witnesses. The cognitive
development of young children is explained and the article emphasises the crucial
need for the proper training of judicial officers in the various developmental changes
in the cognitive development of young children. The Appeal Court's decision in S v B
is discussed and welcomed as it is envisaged that this decision will bring justice to
victims of child sexual abuse. The inability of a young witness to understand the oath
should be clearly distinguished from such a child's reliability as a witness. Finally, the
recommendation is put forward that no distinction should be made between sworn
and unsworn evidence and the Sexual Offences Draft Bill's recommendation for the
abolition of the competency test, is supported.
Introduction
Adults have from time immemorial regarded children's evidence with
scepticism. In court the child witness, instead of the accused who has only to
deny his or her guilt, has to convince the court that he or she is mature and
reliable enough to narrate events truthfully. This article critically analyzes the
evidence of child witnesses in sexual abuse cases. It also discusses the
competency of young children to testify and the administration of oaths by
presiding officers to children as witnesses or complainants. It is argued that
although establishing the truth and obtaining accurate information from child
witnesses is the primary objective in criminal proceedings, the manner in
which this is done effectively excludes young children from the criminal
justice system. It is thus argued that adults working with children should have
knowledge of child development. The last part of this article discusses the
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cognitive development of children. It argues that the triers of fact, especially
attorneys, should recognize young children's limitations as witnesses.
The child's evidence
It has become increasingly difficult to detect and to prove child sexual abuse.
One reason for this is the suspicious manner in which adults approach this
issue. Adults' wariness of children's statements is a reflection of adults' and
society's cultural beliefs. Most cultures including ours hold ambivalent views
about children. Children are sometimes seen as innocent, truthful and
incapable of fabricating false allegations, especially those involving sexual
matters. On the other hand, children may be seen as creatures of
uncontrolled sexual fantasies, unreliable and prone to suggestion.
1
This
ambivalence towards children has resulted in judges and magistrates being
given unbridled discretion in screening the testimony and competency of
child witnesses.
The prejudice against children is more pronounced where they are female
complainants. Female complainants of sexual abuse have always been
regarded as untruthful. This misogynist attitude adopted by society as a
whole has led to the unfortunate perception that complaints of sexual abuse
by children are false, more so if the child victim is a female.
Child sexual abuse continued unabated through the centuries until a
turning point was reached during the 1960s when professionals started to
focus on the seriousness of this social problem. Up to that point there was a
perception among adults that children were not sexually abused, hence the
judicial system did not make provision for child witnesses or complainants. It
is now generally accepted that young children are often victims of sexual
abuse. Nevertheless, old prejudices still persist and their evidence in court is
always treated with caution. Most adults are of the view that children lack the
maturity required to answer questions truthfully.
2
To date, young children
are in most cases still regarded as untruthful despite research findings to the
contrary.
3
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Children are required to possess the following characteristics to testify as
witnesses.
The child should have the capacity to observe
The capacity to observe is defined as the cognitive ability to employ the
senses to receive and register reasonably accurate events.
4
Research findings
on the ability of children to observe and remember events conclude that,
while there are developmental differences between adults and children, it
cannot be said that in general children notice less than adults. Johnson and
Foley
5
are of the view that children are able to observe some events, which
go undetected by adults. The general view is that the old bromide that
children observe less than adults should be discarded because children do
not generally forget events that fall within their frame of experience.
6
In most
cases where they are called as witnesses they have shown an ability and
capacity to observe, register a perception and remember it.
The child should have an adequate memory
A child witness is required to have the capacity to remember the event he or
she is required to describe. Memory is the ability to acquire, store and
retrieve information.
7
When a child testifies about the occurrence of past
events, he or she must do so from present memory of such an event.
Unfortunately memory does not exist as a concrete item, like a book or stone
tablet.
8
There is no guarantee that memory can be read back accurately at the
trial. Rather, memory is a process subject to a variety of influences that can
alter its accuracy.
9
The process of memory is generally divided into three
stages, namely, acquisition, retention and retrieval.
10
The acquisition stage relates to the contemporaneous perception and
encoding of an event in memory. If the event is encoded into the memory
imperfectly, recollections of the event through later testimony will necessarily
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be imperfect. Encoding of a memory may be affected by the prior knowledge
of an event, duration and repetition of the original event.
11
The second stage is known as the retention stage where the memory
simply sits in storage untapped.
12
Many portions of a person's memory
deteriorate through non-use. The strength or otherwise of a child's memory is
dependent on a number of factors: the length of time that has passed, and the
number of times the child has been questioned about the event.
13
The final stage is the retrieval stage. It involves the retrieval of memory
from storage. Children have more difficulty than adults in retrieving
information from long term memory. Myers and Perry
14
are of the view
that although a child needs to possess a minimum degree of memory to be a
competent witness, recollection need not be perfect. The accuracy or
otherwise of a child's memory may be affected by factors such as age,
intelligence, the complexity of the event, the length of time the event was
observed and the delay between the event and the trial.
15
Therefore, it
cannot be said that children generally have deficient memories.
The child should be able to communicate
A child must have the ability to observe an event, remember it, and to be able
to communicate a description of that event in order to be a competent
witness.
16
A child must have a certain level of intelligence, vocabulary and
conversational skills to communicate effectively.
17
Professionals such as
developmental psychologists state that children as young as five years have
the communication skills to effectively relate what they know.
18
A child
should not be regarded as incompetent merely because he or she hesitates or
refuses to answer questions. Hesitancy or refusal to respond may be
attributable to other factors which have nothing to do with competency, such
as stress for example. It is widely accepted that although children sometimes
communicate differently from adults by using child-like language, this does
not prevent them from testifying truthfully, accurately and in a manner which
can be understood.
19
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The child must appreciate the obligation to testify truthfully
In most jurisdictions, including ours, children are required to understand the
difference between the truth and falsehood and to appreciate the obligation
to tell the truth. The majority of pre-schoolers meet these requirements.
20
Three-year-old children can comprehend the duty to tell the truth; however,
triers of fact should allow children to fulfil this requirement in child-like
language.
21
Recent years have seen an increased interest in cognitive psychology and
child development and the willingness of experts from different fields to
work together in an attempt to alleviate the plight of child witnesses.
Consequent research has resulted in a reappraisal of earlier beliefs and a
realization that children's ability to give evidence has been greatly
underestimated.
22
Through empirical research Fouche, Hammond and
Hammond
23
came to this conclusion:
`Our results show clearly that while young children do not perform as well as older
children or adults, they are far from incompetent. Indeed, in the spatial memory
task, they performed better than adults did. Furthermore, their performance
showed no tendency to decline with the passage of time.'
Berliner and Barbieri
24
state that, although adults are often sceptical when
children report sexual abuse, there is little evidence indicating that children's
reports are unreliable, and none at all to support the fear that children often
make false accusations of sexual assault or misinterpret adults' behaviour.
Zieff,
25
when commenting on the reliability of child witnesses, argues that
experimental data from psychological research has played an important role
in dispelling the myths or beliefs regarding the truthfulness of children's
evidence. He is of the view that studies from this field suggest that
children's ability to answer questions, witness or experience events is better
than both law and common belief formerly recognized. Moreover, young
children can respond to the demands of testifying when questions are posed
20
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in a developmentally appropriate way.
26
Data has shown that there is no
basis for the argument or belief that more false charges are laid in regard to
sexual offences than any other type of offence.
It is thus of utmost importance to consider the child's age and stage of
moral development when assessing the youngster's comprehension of the
obligation to be truthful.
Competency examinations: recent South African Case Law
Under South African law, everyone is presumed to be a competent witness,
and young children are competent witnesses if, in the opinion of the court,
they understand what it means to speak the truth.
27
Section 192 of the
Criminal Procedure Act
28
stipulates that: `[E]very person. . .shall. . .be
competent and compellable to give evidence in criminal proceedings.'
It is clear from the Act that there is no age limit in competency and very
young children have been allowed to give evidence. Nevertheless, the
presumption of incompetence still exists, as children are required to pass a
test before their evidence can be admitted. In terms of s 161(1) of the Act no
person may be examined as a witness unless he or she is under oath. The
provisions of the section are peremptory. There are, however, instances
where a witness may give unsworn evidence. In terms of s 164 (1) of the Act
a child can give unsworn evidence, or give evidence without making an
affirmation, provided he or she is admonished to speak the truth. In practice,
the enquiry centres on whether the child is old enough and mature enough
to give evidence at all.
29
The magistrate or judge has to be satisfied that the
child understands what it means to speak the truth. It is clear that a child
must, in order to pass the competency test, be able to demonstrate the ability
to tell the truth from a lie and know that it is wrong to tell a lie. If the child is
unable to do so, he or she cannot be admonished to tell the truth and he or
she is therefore, an incompetent witness. The interpretation of this section by
presiding officers has resulted in the effective exclusion of young witnesses
from the criminal justice system.
In S v N
30
the appellant was charged with indecent assault and sentenced
to three years' imprisonment. In an appeal against the conviction and
sentence the court of appeal examined the proceedings of the regional court
concerning the administration of an oath to the complainant. Van Reenen J
held that where a witness, due to a lack of formal education or any other
26
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reason, might not have the required capacity, the court must, before
administering the oath, enquire whether such a witness understands the
meaning of and possesses the capacity to appreciate and accept the religious
sanction of an oath.
31
Van Reenen J added that if after such an enquiry the
court finds that the witness does not possess the required capacity, it should
determine whether or not he or she understands what it means to speak the
truth and the consequences of lying. If the witness is unable to do so, he or
she should be regarded as incompetent to give evidence. A witness must be
shown to have understood the meaning and religious sanction of an oath and
this involves a factual enquiry. Therefore, the testimony of a witness who has
not been placed under oath properly has not made a proper affirmation or
has not properly been admonished to speak the truth as provided for in the
Act, lacks the status and character of evidence.
32
In S v Seymour
33
the appellant was convicted of murder in the regional
court on the evidence of a thirteen-year-old boy. It appeared on the evidence
that the boy did not understand the nature and meaning of the oath although
he could distinguish between the truth and telling lies. On appeal, Meskin J
held that it was clear that the witness did not understand the nature and
import of the oath. The judge asserted that s 164(1) of the Act can be invoked
once the presiding officer has satisfied himself or herself that the witness
understands the nature and import of an oath. The judge concluded that the
magistrate should not have administered the oath and the witness was
incompetent because he did not know the meaning of an oath. The judge
further stated that a witness's ability to distinguish between truth and falsity
becomes relevant only after the court has concluded that the witness is
unable to understand the import and nature of an oath.
34
In S v Malinga
35
the appellant was convicted in the lower court of the rape
of a nine-year-old girl. The girl testified during the trial. On appeal it was
contended on the appellant's behalf that certain irregularities had occurred
during the course of the trial. On appeal the court had to determine whether
the provisions of s 164(1) of the Act had been complied with. Moleko AJ, in
interpreting the provisions of s 164, stated that their application is subject
to the court embarking upon a two-fold enquiry. First, the court has to
determine whether the child understands the importance of an oath or
31
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affirmation, failing which the provisions of s 164(1) must be applied.
36
Secondly, the presiding officer has to determine whether the child is a
competent witness, that is, whether he or she can distinguish between the
truth and falsehood. In this case the child's evidence was excluded because
an inquiry was not made to determine whether the witness understood the
nature and import of an oath. Moreover, the presiding officer did not
establish whether the witness knew what it means to speak the truth.
The present authors are of the opinion that neither an oath nor the
knowledge of the difference between truth and falsehood, nor the
understanding that punishment may follow a lie, guarantees honesty.
37
Moral knowledge does not necessarily correspond to moral behaviour.
In examining the child, the judicial officer must be able to conclude that he
or she has sufficient intelligence to appreciate the distinction between right
and wrong and truth and falsehood, and to recognize the consequences of
lying.
38
The courts should apply a common sense approach, and the child's
answers should lay a foundation for a finding of competency. A child should
be allowed to testify if the court has satisfied itself that he or she is capable of
giving a truthful and intelligible account of the matter.
39
The triers of fact
should also look at the demeanour of the child witness, his or her maturity
and understanding and consistency of his or her testimony.
It is for this reason that the Supreme Court of Appeal's decision in S v B
40
is to be welcomed. On 15 August 2000, the accused was convicted in the
regional court of the rape of a thirteen-year-old girl and was referred to the
High Court for sentencing in terms of s 52 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act.
41
In the regional court, the complainant was asked whether she
understood what it meant to swear to tell the truth and what it meant if a
person said they would tell the truth. When the matter came before the High
Court for sentencing the conviction was set aside and substituted with a
finding of not guilty. The High Court excluded the evidence of the
complainant as there had been no investigation to justify a finding that
the witness did not understand the nature and import of the oath or
36
The section reads as follows:
`Any person who, from ignorance arising from youth, defective education, or other cause, is
found not to understand the nature and import of an oath or affirmation, may be admitted
to give evidence in criminal proceedings without taking the oath or making the affirmation.
Provided that such person shall, in lieu of the oath or affirmation be admonished by the
presiding Judge or judicial officer to speak the truth and nothing but the truth.'
37
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38
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affirmation due to ignorance arising from youth, defective education or other
cause.
On application by the state, the court a quo reserved certain questions of
law regarding the admissibility of the complainant's evidence. In responding
to these questions, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the relevant
section did not expressly require that an investigation be held and it was not
required in all the circumstances in order to make a finding. Streicher JA was
of the view that the evidence of the complainant was of material importance
and could not be ignored. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the
objection to the admissibility of the complainant's evidence was of a
technical nature. An understanding on her part of the nature and import of
the oath or the affirmation could hardly have made the evidence she gave
less reliable. The Supreme Court of Appeal ordered that the case be referred
back to the court a quo for the hearing of further evidence by the
complainant in an attempt to correct the defect in the original presentation of
her evidence in the court a quo.
In S v Kondile,
42
the accused was convicted of housebreaking with intent
to assault, and assault. The conviction on the count of assault was based
entirely on the testimony of a ten-year-old child who was assaulted by the
accused after he broke into the house. On review, the Ciskei High Court set
aside the conviction on the count of assault on the grounds that the
complainant's evidence was inadmissible. Ebrahim J held that s 164 of the Act
required an enquiry before the decision to administer the admonition be
taken. Ebrahim J was of the view that the magistrate should have conducted
a proper enquiry to establish whether the child witness was able to
distinguish between the truth and a lie and the consequences that might flow
from telling lies. The question asked of the witness by the magistrate could
not establish these pertinent issues. The judge held, therefore, that
competence and the justification for admonishing the witness must be
established. This decision is contrary to that reached by the Supreme Court of
Appeal in S v B
43
which held that s 164 did not expressly require that an
investigation be held.
The above cases and the different decisions arrived at give credence to our
argument that the presumption of competence should apply to children, and
the reliability or otherwise of their evidence should be determined from the
evidence.
The South African Law Commission supported the view that the
competency requirement is commonly used as an exclusionary mechanism
in that a witness's competency to testify is restricted to the provisions of the
42
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Criminal Procedure Act. The Commission
44
stated that presiding officers do
not have the necessary skills to make an assessment of the witness's
cognitive abilities. The Commission recommended that a witness should not
be disqualified from testifying if found to be unable to define the difference
between the truth and a lie.
45
The test instead should be whether a witness is
able to understand questions put before him or her and in return supply
answers the court can understand.
46
If it is uncertain whether a witness is
capable of communicating, an expert should be called to assist. The
child should be allowed to give unsworn evidence, and the presiding
officer should decide on the weight to be attached to such evidence. The
child should nevertheless, depending on the seriousness of the proceedings,
be enjoined to tell the truth.
47
The South African Law Commission
48
has recommended that s 164(1) of
the Act be amended and that all witnesses below the age of 18 years be
regarded competent to testify. The test should be whether a witness
understands the questions put to him or her and is able to give answers that
the court can understand. Competency to testify may only be excluded if
a witness lacks the mental and/or verbal skills to respond to questions in a
manner that can be understood in court.
The Commission further recommends that a child should be allowed to
give unsworn evidence if found to be unable to take an oath. Certain
conditions have to be met, the child must understand questions put to him or
her and be able to respond to such questions in an intelligible manner. If
evidence is given unsworn, the child must be admonished to speak the truth.
The cognitive development of young children
A child who is required to give evidence in court either as a witness or a
complainant is faced with numerous challenges. He or she might be required
to show an understanding of the world in which he or she lives. This is
referred to as a manifestation of the cognitive development of the child, and
it involves changes in children's intellectual abilities and their knowledge of
the world throughout their course of development.
44
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It is important for judicial officers and attorneys to have knowledge and be
trained on matters relating to the development of young children.
49
Goodman submits, correctly in our view, that training in child development
at the very least is important for obtaining accurate testimony from children.
She supports this assertion by providing this example:
`A child, three years of age, who had been abducted from her home by a strange
man, described on the day she was found how the ``gordle pushed her and made
her bleed'' and how the ``gordle scratched her arm''. In their report, the police
wrote that she said, ``him pushed me and made me bleed''. But the screening of the
audio taped interview by an expert in children's testimony and consultations with
the child's mother revealed that ``gordle'' was this three-year-old's word for girl.
The possibility therefore arose that the man who kidnapped her had an accomplice
(a possibility made plausible by other evidence as well).'
50
Goodman states, as this example also illustrates, that children sometimes
attempt to provide crucial details, but people who lack training in child
development could easily fail to understand them.
The section below discusses developmental changes in children's
representation of the world as these developmental changes impact on
children's ability as witnesses.
Enactive representation
This form of representation occurs at infancy. Young children cannot
separate themselves from the world and objects in it, therefore they have to
define events by the actions they evoke.
51
Myers and Perry
52
refer to this
point in the child's life as the sensation-bound stage. They are of the view
that children are at this juncture faced with a number of challenges. For
instance, children must learn to define things by manipulation and try to
record the existence of objects in memory.
53
It is unlikely for attorneys to
work with children at this stage. It is nevertheless not unusual for older
children to regress to this level after they have been severely traumatized.
54
In the event of this happening, children should be allowed to give their
testimony in an enactive way by allowing them to use anatomically correct
dolls or other props.
55
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Imaginal representation
Children begin to rely upon imaginable representation at the age of two.
56
Children use their memories to store mental pictures of what they have
encountered. It is technically possible for a child at this stage to serve as a
witness. Children as young as two to three years are able to store an accurate
image of the scene and retain it through adulthood as long as they attended
and perceived an event accurately.
57
Attorneys working with children must
always bear in mind that children between the ages of two and three and, in
some instances older children, may have substantial difficulty in sponta-
neously offering information through free recall.
58
It is therefore the
responsibility of attorneys and other triers of fact to elicit information
through artful questioning. Use should be made of simple, direct, non-
leading questions that are able to tap into the details of the stored image.
59
Linguistic representation
In order to participate in court as a witness, a child must have the ability to
communicate in a manner that can be understood by adults.
60
Myers and Perry
61
are of the view that words and symbols are a much
more powerful form of representation than patterns or images. Words allow
children to both represent experiences and transform them. Unfortunately,
words may be one step removed from the vivid mental snapshot of early
childhood, and can therefore distort memory.
62
Although the linguistic
abilities of young children may be an asset in preventing memory distortions,
their immaturity may nevertheless cause problems in other areas.
63
For
example, early stages of linguistic representation sometimes result in
miscommunication, hence attorneys and the courts working with children
must be adept at communicating on the child's level.
64
Categorical representation
This form of representation allows children to divide the diversity of the
world into manageable concepts, for instance:
`[I]f the child were asked, ``Did the man take off his clothes?'' he or she might
respond ``No'', but if asked, ``Did the man take off his pants?'' he or she might
56
Myers and Perry op cit (n4) at 472.
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respond ``yes''. In the questioner's mind, the first question might subsume the
second, but for the child, clothes and pants may be two distinct ideas. Thus the
child's testimony may appear to be inconsistent when it really is not.'
65
Triers of fact should always be careful when asking questions that call for a
categorization by the child based on concepts of kind and unkind. The
authors state that the question `Is your mother kind to you?' calls for an
opinion or categorization by the child based on concepts of kind and
unkind.
66
Although categorical questions may be helpful, their dangers are
that they may at times result in inaccurate testimony.
Children should be asked to describe specific incidents.
67
Young children
are not adept at interpreting information with the result that they might over-
simplify complex information. In most cases children perceive things as good
or bad, heroic or evil. The shades of grey that often characterize real life are
unknown to them.
68
Cognitive limitations of young children
Adults should try to determine the child's cognitive development. The latter
is based on the premise that children show similar mental, emotional and
social abilities, and undergo similar changes at roughly comparable ages.
69
The child's cognitive development is important in that it helps to explain the
child's inconsistencies or otherwise when relating events.
70
Generally
children between the ages of three to six years can be competent and
effective as witnesses. However, attorneys should acknowledge that the
abilities of children are limited.
First, triers of fact should always bear in mind that children are self-centred
in that they are unable to see things from other people's perspective.
71
They
should therefore be asked to describe events from their own perspective.
Secondly, triers of fact should bear in mind that although children may be
able to arrange objects or images in a series, they cannot draw on inferences
about non-adjacent components.
72
For example, the child may be able to
think about three men, Bill, Tom and Sam and conclude that Bill is taller than
Tom and Sam is taller than Bill, but be unable to figure out the answer to the
65
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question `who is the tallest?'
73
Attorneys can avoid confusing the child by
requiring the child to give simple descriptions instead of requiring them to
make comparisons.
74
Conclusion
Child abuse has become a highly prevalent social evil in South Africa. Now,
more than ever, the community expect the perpetrators of this heinous crime
to be brought to justice. The South African criminal justice system is tasked to
prosecute, convict and punish convicted criminals in child sexual abuse
cases.
This article explains the difficulty in obtaining this precise result, especially
where the victim is a very young child. Due to the suspicion and ignorance of
adults, young children are often excluded from the criminal justice system by
being characterized as unreliable witnesses.
Apart from briefly explaining the various developmental changes in the
cognitive development of young children, this article emphasizes the crucial
need for the training of attorneys and judicial officers in the cognitive
development of young children. This will prevent young children from
merely being excluded from the criminal justice process. Moreover, more
convictions in cases of child sexual abuse might be obtained.
It is envisaged that the Appeal Court's decision in S v B
75
will have an
enormous positive impact on setting South Africa on the path to a system of
justice for victims of child sexual abuse. The Court of Appeal stated very
clearly that justice not only requires that an innocent person should not be
wrongly convicted, but also that a person who committed a crime should be
duly punished for it. It is clear from this decision that the inability of a child
witness, due to youthfulness, to understand the nature or import of an oath
will have no impact on the reliability of the testimony given by such a child.
The evidence of such a child thus cannot be disregarded when it comes to
evaluating the merits of a case.
We support the view that triers of fact should not always treat the evidence
of a child witness with caution and must not call for corroboration of
evidence solely on account of the fact that the witness is the complainant of a
sexual offence or a child.
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Section 10 of the Children's Bill
77
stipulates that
every child who is capable of participating meaningfully in criminal
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proceedings concerning that child has a right to participate in those
proceedings and views expressed by such child should be taken into
consideration. We recommend that the court should determine from the
evidence whether a child is truthful or not. Triers of fact should also have
regard to the child's maturity, his or her ability to communicate and whether
or not he or she is able to respond to simple questions. The court should look
at whether a child is able to give a rational account of events because if able
to, he or she will also appreciate the importance of speaking the truth.
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